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Productivity and the Enactment of a Macro Culture 
This paper reports the puzzling results of a study which examined IT capital investment 
and productivity at three of the largest IT user sites in the U.S. for the period 1970-1990: Social 
Security Administration JSSA), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Federal Bureau of 
Investisation P I ) .  Based on detailed IT investment, employment, and output data over nventy 
years, we  found that only one agency had achieved significant productivity benefits, a second 
agency had modest results, and a third asency achieved no results whatever. These results 
cannot be explained by traditional theories of productivity of how productivity is produced. 
We argue that IT-induced productivity results not simply from strategic choice, nor rhe 
operation of the invisible hand in the market place, nor simply from keen managers adjusting 
their organizations to an "objective" environment. Instead we propose instead a new theory in 
which productivity benefits derive from a larger macro-culture enacted by powefil institutions 
in an organizational field. We extend this analysis to the larger economy and examine how this 
new theory helps us understand recent claims that IT is finaIly having positive productivity 
benefits at the sector level, and also helps us understand how the current fascination with re- 
engineering and downsizing may be a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
1 .0  Productivity: Concept and Measure 
There are several difficulties with the concept and measure of productivity. The first 
difficulty is understanding what productivity is and how it might be measured over interesting 
periods of time. The second difliculty is understanding how productikity is produced over 
interesting periods of time. These difficulties'are largely independent--solving the former will 
not necessarily solve the latter. 
The least controversial aspect of productivity research is its elementary definition as a 
measure of economic efficiency arrived at by dividing all outputs by all inputs (U.S. Department 
of Labor, 1938). Generally the focus is on units of output and input, and not prices, revenues 
or costs except where physical unit data is unavailable. Outputs are defined as economic goods 
and services, and inputs are defined as labor, capital, services, knowledge and energy. When 
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only price or revenue data is available, then deflators are used to adjust for inflation over 
specified time periods (usually no longer than a decade). 
In many cases input data is not available and is too costly to collect because there are so  
many different inputs. The most widely used single factor productivity time series in the U.S. is 
output per hour which divides outputs by total labor hours of input to produce an output per 
hour measure. Other measures of productivity attempt to take into account the role of other 
inputs besides labor. Multifactor productivity measures like the capital-labor index and the 
KLEM (capital, labor, energy, materials and services) index are available for only the 
manufacturing sector (U.S. Department of Labor, 1988). 
After these simple initial definitions and measurement techniques, controversy is rife. 
Some well known limitations of productivity research are: 
(1) Natural units. Natural units of output may not be available. This forces researchers to base 
the value of outputs on the value of inputs, resulting in permanent zero productivity growth. 
Poor or no systematic productivity measures exist for sectors and industries like government 
agencies, non-profits, and educational institutions, along with the FIRE division (finance, 
insurance and real-estate), and services which account for more than 60% of the GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product) (Baily and Gordon, 1988). This means that for much of the "information 
economy", involving large occupational groups like managers, clerical workers, technical, 
professional and kindred workers (which do not correspond to the BLS industry divisions but 
which are of interest to scholars), have no natural outputs and have no economy-wide 
productivity measures. But, as we show below, for selected organizations it is possible to 
develop natural outputs and calculate productivity measures. Alternatively, researchers can 
change the output measure fiom physical units to a financial measure like gross revenues, and 
use a price defiator to account for inflation. This method does suEer fiom one critical fact: it 
fails to account for competition in markets which may reduce prices o f  outputs much more than 
inflation. Productivity may increase greatly in terms of output of units per hour, but the "worth" 
of this output in the marketplace may fall precipitously, and hence the value of the output per 
unit of labor input may decline. Physical productivity may rise while return on investment 
(ROI) declines. 
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(2) Substitution effects. Increasing output per hour of labor input can take place simply by 
substituting one factor of production for another and without change in intrinsic productivity for 
any specific input. For instance, by doubling the number of printers in an office, the output of 
clerical workers may rise not because of any intrinsic change in the productivity of clerical labor 
blit simply because of the substitution of capital for labor. Likewise, better input materials (e.g. 
pre-printed forms) and more sophisticated external services (outsourcing of software 
development) also will enhance output per hour productivity measures. Panko and others have 
calculated that substitution of labor by capital, energy, materials, and outside services accounts 
for anywhere from 70 to 80% of productivity growth in the periods 1949-1983 (Panko, 1991; 
Nosworthy and Malmquist, 1985; Gullickson and Harper, 1987). This criticism is less 
convincing when focusing on the efficiency of the £im as a whole due to all causes rather than 
focusing on "output per labor input hour." When interest shifts to this broader productiGty 
concern, the sources of productivity growth--whether by substitution or intrinsic change in 
productivity of a single factor like labor-- are of less interest. 
A related puzzle involves substitution of occupational groups for one another and the 
interdependence of the manufacturing and service sectors. For instance, about 60% of the 
service sector output is purchased by the manufacturing sector, and about 40% of the 
manufacturing sector output is purchased by the service sector mornbush, et. al., 1988). 
Through capital investment, factories have experienced growing productivity resulting in kwer 
factory workers to produce the required output in the period 1960-1990. At the same time, 
sales, marketing, and financial employment has increased enormously While factory workers 
declined from 25% to IS%, service sector employment expanded fiom 25% to 30% of the labor 
force (U.S. Census, 1991). This results in output per hour measures for factories increasing 
significantly, while office productivity stagnates, making measured office output per hour 
meaningless. Clearly a part of the productivity growth in factories is a result of supporting 
inputs fiom the service sector. A computer-based, micro-marketing sales force, for instance, 
can help a factory optimize its production schedule, reducing inputs of factory labor, making 
factory productivity soar. 
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( 2 )  The quality of outputs. Even if outputs can be agreed upon, there is little or no accounting 
for changes in the quality of outputs. Measuring productivity over even moderate periods of 
time (greater than 3 years) runs into the difficulty that overtime product quality changes. 
Automobiles, computers, legal services, financial services, and health care sesvices now have 
features and qualities which either did not exist in the past or which have greatly improved. A 
1994 Power PC desktop computer of 100 MIPS power is just not the same as a 1984 PC AT of 
.5 MCPS even though both are counted as desktop PCs. Hence a unit of output is not constant 
over time even if it appears in our aggregate statistics as a constant unit. 
(4) Problems of aggregation and levels of-analysis. Findings on productivity can vary depending 
on the Ievel of analysis adopted. For instance, while average productivity in a sector like the 
FIRE sector (financial services including finance, insurance and real-estare) may be quite low or 
even negative, specific industries and sub-industries like commercial banking or investment 
banking may show quite high productivity growth. While a sub-division like insurance may 
experience no productivity growth, some insurance firms may experience rapid productivity 
growth. Likewise within f h s :  the firm may show low productivity growth, but some divisions 
or profit centers may have excellent productivity growth. In general, aggregating to higher 
levels of analysis may disguise interesting productivity changes even as it illuminates overall 
trends in the economy. This problem becomes particularly intriguing when seeking to 
understand the impact of a single factor like information technology. Ofien, firms gather data on 
firm wide IT expenditures but they may not record information on divisional or  profit center IT 
spending. This makes it difficult to assess the-productivity impacts of IT. The positive impacts 
of IT spending in some profit centers may be overwhelmed by the poor pexformance of other 
profit ceriters in the £irm. ' 
2.0 Productivity and Information Technology 
Digital information technology--perhaps more than any other single technology in 
industrial history-- promised to have enormous impacts on economic efficiency and productivity 
because of its direct impact on an important factor of production, namely, information and 
knowledge. In advanced information economies, where information and knowledge workers 
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account for 60% of GDP ( Wolfi-and Baumol, 1987 ), it makes sense to believe that the vasi 
improvements in computer hardware and software over the last 20 years, and the vast increases 
in IT investment both in factories and offices, would surely lead to widespread and powefil 
gains in productivity as a direct result of IT investments. But while U.S. spending on IT surged 
in the period 1970- 1990, little formal evidence exists linking IT investment to productivity. 
There have been positive findings (Osterrnan, 1986; Cron and Sobol, 1983; 1986; Harris'and 
Katz, 1988; Bresnahan, 1986) , contradictory findings (Attewell, 1991 ; Franke, 1987 ), outright - 
negative findings (Strassman, 1985; Berndt and Morrison, 1992; Loveman, 1988, 1991; Barua, 
Kriebel and Mukhopadhay 1991; Roach, 1988), as well as qualified findings where productivity 
gains were found contingent on a number of environmental and management factors ( Weill, 
" 
1992; Franke, 1987; Bender 1986). In ~eneral, AtteweU (1 99 1 : 10) concludes "Looking at 
these studies overall, what is impressive is the fact that despite very large investments in IT, 
productivity payoffs are elusive." 
Several reasons have been adduced for the confi-xsed findings in the IT-productivity 
literature. Panko (1991) argues that the measures of productivity are too inexact (or non- 
existent) precisely in those sectors where IT investment has been largest (oEce work), and that 
assuming IT has a similar return on investment as other forms of capital (overall capital 
investment accounts for only about .6% of productivity growth per year), then the IT 
productivity impact would only be about .2% per year overall in the economy, and as large as 
.4% in office work. Panko concludes "Given the measurement and interpretation problems . . . 
it is doubthl that such small annual impacts could be separated from the "noise" in the analysis." 
(Panko 199 1 : 199). Criticism of government data sets generally conclude they have overstated 
increases in productivity, especially those due to information technology manufacture @she1 
1958). Attewell(1991) essentially agrees with the negative findings, arguing that IT has 
caused a shift towards slower channels of communications (voice and face-to-face towards 
typed documents and e-mail), greater formalization of communication, a wastehl fixation with 
quality in documents based on the ease of using word processing packages, rapid change in 
software and resulting extended learning curves, an explosion in group generated paperwork not 
related to valuable outputs, and a burgeoning of middle management interested in using 
computers to extend their control and their own employment. Weill (1992) , in contrast, argues 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-94-01 
that the efficiency impacts (return on investment) of IT depends on the types of applications 
built (transactional systems have large impacts on efficiency but not management information 
systems) and the political and social stability of the firm. More stable and consensual firms 
experience greater positive impacts. However this study was limited to only 33 firms in a single 
manufacturing industry (valves) which is very different from information and knowledge based 
firms and organizations which produce 60% of the GNP, and where, as Panjto points out, most 
of the IT have investment and intensity occurs. 
In perhaps the most comprehensive and representative sample of large industrial firms, 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1 993) found striking evidence that the return on investment in IT was 
68% in manufacturing and services, far greater than the return on other forms of capital (around 
6%) , and that spending on IS labor was far more productive than non-IS labor. The study was 
based on data fiom 3 80 large, mostly manufacturing firms over the period 1987- 199 1. 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt attributed their highly positive findings to a much larger data set at the 
firm level than previous studies, and the currency of their data which they believe captured both 
the impacts of the huge growth in IT spending from 1985-1990, as well as the impacts of 
management learning how to use IT effectively. They provide no evidence to support this 
speculation. They conclude that "Under this interpretation, our high estimates of computer ROI 
indicate that businesses are reaping the rewards fiom the experimentation and learning phase in 
the early 1980s." Over time they speculate that returns from IT investments should grow as 
firms and managers move up the learning curve, and as the investment in IT continues to swell. 
Unfortunately, recent work by the Economist Greenstein (1993) does not support the idea that 
productivity impacts'of IT lag behind investments because of learning curve delays in 
implementing best practice. ' Nevertheless, this is an important speculation for us because it 
suggests several organizational and historical mechanisms through which the productivity 
impacts of IT are produced, or, similarly, fail to appear. 
3.0 Understanding the Origins of Productivity 
Most investigations of IT-based productivity ignore the organizational processes which 
bring about productivity impacts (or the lack thereof). Yet the inescapable conclusion after 
reviewing the literature on IT and productivity is that the results in investment are variable, and 
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perhaps dependent on historical period (with earlier investments having lower returns, but also 
lower returns being associated with periods of high ~echnological change and competence 
destroying change) , management and staff learning, organizational stability, and organizational 
variables not yet identified. (Tushman, 1986). ' The lack of theoretical sophistication in this 
area hampers our understanding of precisely how IT may or may not impact productivity. Using 
a classification schema developed by Astley and Van de Ven (1 983), we can divide studies of 
productivity along two dimensions: voluntarism-determinism, and micro-macro (Figure 1) 
Figure 1 
Theoretical Perspectives on Productivity 
Macro 
(markets, 
populations) 
Micro 
(single firm) 
Deterministic ---- Voluntaristic 
Natural 
Selection 
(3) 
System 
Structural 
(2) 
Most studies of productivity in the business literature are studies of a single firm with a 
Collective 
Action 
(4) 
Strategic 
Choice 
(1) 
proactive management that implements a "strategic" system that has powerful, positive impacts 
on productivity (Applegate, Cash, and Mlls, 1988; Frito-Lay, 1993; Baxter-AHSP, 1991) 
[Strategic Choice Model 11. Almost all of the so-called re-engineering literature falls into this 
category (Hammer and Champy, 1993). In these studies managers scan their environments, 
watching competing firms, technologies, business metaphors and markets; based on these 
assessments, managers enact both environments and organizational structures, enfusing both 
with their meanings, ideologies, visions, and understandings of how to conduct business (Weick, 
1979; 1993). Managers choose which enviro~nmental niches to enter and exit, which products to 
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manufacture and how. Over time managers "experiment" by creating new programs and 
routines (Starbuck, 1983) and they "learn" (Porter, 1985 ; Attewell, 1992; Kling and Iacono, 
1984; Huber, 1990). IT has a positive impact on firm productivity because managers correctly 
enact their firm's environment, and structure, and they creatively develop a set of firm-level 
action programs and routines which result in raising productivity. 
A growing number of IT-productivity researchers employ a system-structural and 
contingency view [Systeni Structural Model 21 inwhich organizations must learn to adapt to 
their changing environments, changing technology, and resources (uleifl, 1992; Brynjolfsson and 
Hitt ,1993; Sproull and Kiesler, 199 1 ; 1992 ): The focus is on individual firms. In this view 
environments are given, "objective," and managers reactively must adjust their firms structure, 
culture, size, and use of IT to these environments. Such adjustments in the organizations 
structure are either "fimctional" or not depending on their impact on the ultimate goal of the firm 
which is survival at least, efficiency at best (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Galbraith, 1979; 
1953). IT-enduced productivity gains result when managers correctly perceive environmental 
changes (determined by exogenous forces), when they structure roles and hierarchies to "fit" 
this environment, and when they "learn" how to use IT effectively. For Brynjolfhon and E t t  
(1993), as an example, productivity from IT comes after managers go through an extended 
learning process, and after they correctly perceive the enormous ROI available from IT. 
The disciplines traditionally concerned with productivity --industrial economics, 
economic history, micro-economics, and population ecologists in sociology-- form a third view 
of productivity [model 3 above]( Chandler, 1962). These researchers shift the focus from the 
firm to markets and market niches (or environments with limited resources), to populations and 
communities of organizations Wrsch, 1975; DiMaggio and Powell, 1953; Hannan and Freeman, 
1977). Organizational structure and management actions are largely determined by economic 
markets and available technologies. The key concepts are variation, selection, and retention, 
along with birth rates of new firms and death rates of old firms. As environments change, new 
firms are continually being formed in essentially random patterns; when their behavior finds 
external resources in a market niche, the firms thrive and multiply. Eventually, as environments 
change, these firms lose resources and die out. Environmental selection is the key actor--not 
managers. Organizations are brittle, and faced with "frame breaking changes" in technology and 
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environments, they tend to die (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Starbuck, 1989) Researchers 
in this perspective generally use long term (20-50 year) industry or sector data to study patrerns 
of organizational birth and death (McKelvey and Aldrich, 1983). A related but difierent 
perspective focuses on institutional isomorphism (the fact that organizations in the same 
organizational field over time come to look and act alike) @LMaggio and Powell, 1983). Rather 
than attribute the similarities among organizations in the same population niche to environmental 
selection, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) attribute organizational isomorphism to coercive, 
mimetic, and normative pressures on organizations to adopt the "correct" processes and 
structures. For instance, firms respond to coercive State pressures to  adopt standard operatins 
procedures, they "model" themselves on successhl organizations (and share personnel and 
consultants with one another), and they willingly adopt professional norms of structure and 
conduct. 
As far as we know there are no empi&cal studies employing a natural selection theory in 
IT-related productivity research although several theoretical tracts come close to this position at 
times. All IS literature that has an aura of inevitability in which managers must change their 
organizations (reduce hierarchy, lower the decision making locus, empower workers, etc.) 
because of a technologically or socially determined environment or face extinction fall into this 
type of reasoning. Malone, Yates, and Benjamin (1987 ) argue, for instance, that over time 
firms must inevitably move towards a greater reliance on markets rather than hierarchies to  
conduct business because firms who do this will be more efficient. SprouI and Kiesler (1991) 
argue that the new telecommunications technology will shape the form of new successhl 
organizations in the future. The new technology will create new kinds of firms where jobs are 
widely physically distributed, authority is decentralized, and information is widely shared. 
~ r u c k i r  (1988) argues that firms must reduce organizational levels by using new information 
technology or face extinction. 
Throughout most of these theoretical tracts is the clear implication that firms which fkil 
to adapt to the new IT-determined environment in the proscribed m m e r  will be extinct, driven 
fiom the market by svelte new firms employing the latest "best practice" in tech-organization 
design. There is precious little data to support any of these claims and given the newness o f  
information technology, and its rapid rate of change, there simply are no long term data sets yet 
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to confirm or deny these propositions . The more general literature on technological change ( 
Sahal, 198 1; Tushman and Anderson, 1986) focuses on the extinction of firms caused by 
disappearing market niches brought about by technology change per se and offers little hope that 
adopting the "right" organizational firm could have saved any of the now extinct Arms. Could 
organizational change have saved the Lehigh Coal Company, once one of the largest 25 
corporations in h e r i c a ' i n  1919? History suggests the answer is no, and that very few 
organizations survive more than 50 years (Starbuck, 1989). 
A fourth category of theory which can help explain productivity changes caused by IT is 
the collective action view (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; DLVaggio, 1989; Abolaffia and Kildufil 
1988; Fombrun and Abrahamson, 1992). In this view organizations form networks of 
interaction along lines of competition, alliances, and resource dependencies. These networks 
define organizational fields (sets of interdependent organizations hlfilling particular social 
hnctions (Fombrun, 1986)) , organizational and industry boundaries (Porac and Thomas, 1990) 
, and macro cultures (Sproull, 1981) . Macro cultures are the bedrock shared understandings 
and expectations which arise from organizational fields and which define acceptable behavior, 
which rank organizations in the field (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990) , define acceptable "recipes" 
(Grinyer and Spender, 1979), standard procedures, routines, and strategies to be used, and 
acceptable structures to employ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) . Macro cultures diFer from firm 
level micro cultures because they originate outside the firm from the organizational field, 
generally have multiple participants, and reflect the collective enactment of shared beliefs about 
the environment. Change takes place through bargaining, conflict, negotiation with significant 
others in the organizational field, and through changes in the macro culture. The concept of a 
macro culture is a cognitive concept based on the observation that organizations acting in 
concert with others can in fact change and enact their environments through trade associations, 
lobbying of governments, professional societies, competitive alliances with firms up and down 
the value chains, and through competition with others in their organizational fields. The role o f  
managers here is to interact with other organizations, and to participate in the larger macro 
culture of which their firm is a part. 
There is a considerable empirical literature in IS that uses a collective action perspective 
although it has received less attention from popular media than it should have. Virtually all the 
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literature on public sector uses of IS takes the view that adoption of IT in American government 
was heavily influenced by macro level political, social, and cultural factors (Laudon, 1974; 
Kling, 1974; King and Kraemer, 1986; Laudon, 1986). ~et'ailed analyses of specific private 
sector IT implementations (Markus, 1983; ) and general analyses of the social construction of 
IT systems (Keen 1981; Kling and Iacono, 1988) describe the role of micro political factors and 
point to larger macro cultural factors in the propagation of computing, computing styles and 
applications. This literature argues that IT implementations are negotiated and enacted orders 
reflecting the strength, interests, and values of participants in the development process. 
Collective action theory has not been applied before to understanding productivity 
changes resulting fiom IT. Below we present data on the productivity impacts of IT at three 
different agencies of the Federal government over the period 1970-1 990. We demonstrate that 
a collective action perspective provides valuable insights into the IT productivity relationship. 
4.0 Information Technology at SSA, IRS, and the FBI, 1970-1990 
The Social Security Administration (SSA), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are among the largest and in some areas the most 
sophisticated users of information technology in the civilian economy of the U.S. SSA began 
developing automated large file handling techniques with Tt3M as early as 1940; the 3331 began 
using digital computers in the mid 1950s. The IRS began using di~ital  computers much later, in 
the early 1960s. 
SSA employs 65,000 workers to maintain earnings data on over 200 million American 
citizens who are current or former labor force participants, distributes 40 million checks each 
month, and administers a number of complex, earnings based social welfare programs the largest 
of which is the Old Age and Survivors Insurance program. SSA maintains a centralized 
organizational structure established in 1936, including a large centralized mainframe-based data 
center in Baltimore, Maryland, connected via satellite to 10 regional centers and 1300 local SSA 
offices throughout the country. Following the near collapse of its data processing systems in the 
late 1 9 7 0 ~ ~  SSA began a $2 billion prosram to rebuild its systems and re-design its 
organizational and work processes ( S S q  1993). 
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IRS employs 120,000 workers to maintain earnings data on 200 million working 
Americans and 4.4 million other reporting entities, and to administer the tax laws of the United 
States. IRS maintains a centralized organizational structure originally established in the 1920s 
including a large centralized mainframe data center in Martinsburg, Virginia, connected via a 
variety of telecommunications links to 10 regional service centers where paper tax returns are 
initially processed into computer tapes which are then transported physically to Martinsburg. 
Despite massive increases in computer processing power, by most accounts the IRS 
administrative systems neared collapse in the late 1980s. IRS systems have changed little since 
the early 1960s except for hardware upgrades, and the system is at the limits of its performance 
capability. The IRS is currently engaged in a $6-8 billion modernization program. Wational 
Research Council 1992; GAO 1990). 
The FBI employs 24,000 workers to investigate violations of federal statutes and provide 
criminal investigation and criminal history records to 58 local Fl3I odiices and more than 64,000 
state and local police agencies in the US. The FBI maintains a centralized organizational 
structure established in 1934, including a large centralized mainframe based data center in 
Washington D.C. (supported by three regional processing centers). The FBI maintains a 
database of over 200 rnillion fingerprint records on civilians, and armed forces personnel, 86 
million of which are criminal histories. 10 million of the criminal history records are fblly 
computerized at the National Crime Information Center along with a variety of stolen property 
and warrant files. About 500,000 transactions per day are processed at NCIC. The FBI is 
currently engaged in a $100 million upgrade (NCIC 2000) involving significant enhancements to 
the central database and installation of 64,000 terminals around the country (U.S. Department of 
Justice, 1993). 
Data 
The findings reported here are based upon a larger study of long term historical 
trends in information processing at the three agencies in the period 1940-1994. The study is 
based on 155 interviews with agency management, users, and vendors at federal, state and local 
levels in the period, General Accounting Ofice investigators, members of Congress, 
Congressional staff, 1985-1994. In addition we gathered detailed quantitative data from a 
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variety of private, federal agency, federal budget, and Congressional documents on the 
following variables: 
Employmenr: Detaikd occupational data on each agency, 1940- 1990. 
Workload: Detailed data on the number of forms processed (5% and LRS), clients, services 
provided to clients, and (FBI) fingerprints stored and record requests processed, 1940-1990. 
Other related work load data not reported here was also collected. 
InsraIied base: Detailed data on specific installed mainframe and mini computer machines, 
capacities (MIPS), and manufacturer. This data was gathered from GSA (General Services 
Administration Annual surveys, interviews, and agency reports). 
Budgets: Detailed budgetary data on investment in information technology capital 
(communications, data processing, and office equipment expenditures, 1940- 1990), non- 
information technology capital, labor, semices, and real-estate. 
Woges: Detailed wage data on employees, 1940-1 990. 
Only the analyses concerning IT impacts on productivity are reported here. The analysis is 
limited to the period 1970-1990 because this period contains the most precise data, and it is the 
period of intensive investment in IT. Forthcoming papers describe occupational and 
employment impacts, patterns of budgetary growth, and patterns of technological advancement 
and d&sion. 
Measures 
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Our interest in this paper is in identifying and understanding the relationship between 
productivity and the installed base of computing power over a twenty year period. There is little 
doubt that we  have reasonably precise measures of IT capital installed (both monetary values 
and physical (MIPS) and the size of the labor force. Measuring the dependent variable, 
productivity, is less precise in this data. The dependent variable varies by agency but focuses in 
all cases on the labor productivity with respect to the primary work loads of  the agencies. In the - 
case of S S 4  the dependent variable is the total number of clients served by the agency in each 
year divided by the total number of employees at SSA At the IRS the dependent variable, 
productivity, is measured by the number of tax forms processed per employee. In the case of the 
FBI, productivity is measured by the number of fingerprints of all kinds (computerized and 
non-computerized) stored by the FBI per employee. 
As with all productivity measures, ours suffer a variety of problems. Not all the work at 
any of these agencies is entirely captured by these .measures. Clearly a core mission of the FBI 
since the 1930s has been the creation, maintenance, and growth of its criminal history files and 
civilian fingerprint based identification systems (Laudon, 1986). Yet one third of the FBI labor 
force are investigators who, while they contribute to and draw from the fingerprint files, are not 
themselves actively engaged in fingerprint and record processing. Better measures for FBI 
output were sought, but the agency was uncooperative at every turn. ( 5 )  
KRS also has a large number of people devoted exclusively to processing tax forms and 
also a significant number of employses devoted to tax compliance and enforcement. At SSA 
there are actually only a few employees devoted to maintaining the records while most 
employees are devoted to providing service to SSA clients. 
For the IRS and SSA, the nature and quality ofthe work that is being performed also 
changed over time. This is a problem that occurs for measuring productivity changes for any 
service based organization. We know of no.data source that measures changes in the output 
quality of any of these three agencies. One source of quality changes is the changing complexity 
of the work load. Although we developed several measures of complexity of work for this time 
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period, none contributed usehl information to the problem of productivity at these agencies or 
altered the results reported here.' 
The best measure we have of productivity changes is thus the simple one of the measure 
of total output divided by total labor, which is the measure used by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics in estimating changes in Qovernment productivity W.S. Dept. of Labor, BLS 19881. 
While our measures of productivity our admittedly gross, we feel they roughly shadow real 
changes in productivity at these agenciese no matter how that is measured. Our data extend over 
a twenty year time frame and they roughly track the changes in productivity experienced in 
non-~overnmental information work sectors like FIRE (Finance, Insurance, Real-estate). For 
these reasons we believe our measures reflect real changes in productivity at these agencies. 
Findings 
The null hypothesis we are testing is (1) there is no relationship between installed IT 
capital and productivity. Figure 2 presents a graphical display of the data for the three agencies. 
Figure 2 
Productivity, &lTPS, Employment, and Workload by Agency 
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Clearly, there are significant diEerences in the changes in productivity among the three 
agencies. v At the FBI, productivity has remained fairly constant while computing power has 
increased. FBI workload and the size of the labor force have both varied. At IRS, productivity 
has declined since 1982 while workload, labor force, and installed computer capacity have 
steadily increased for the entire two decades. At SSA, productivity has increased since 1982, 
while workload and installed computer capacity has increased during the entire time. The size of 
the SSA's labor force though has varied, increasing and then, since 1983, decreasing steadily. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for these various measures and includes the simple 
correlation matrix among the variables, again, by agency. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics by Agency, 1970--1990 
Corre la t ions  and  Descriptive Statist ics 
T a b l e  l a  Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Fingerprints p e r  Employee 
Fingerprints on File 
ru'umber of Employees 
Table l b  Internal  Revenue Service 
FnrrrlEmp FISGERPR E3TPLOYEE h I P S  
1 .O 0.80818 -0.53653 -0.55480 
0.80818 1 .O 0.06163 -0.06042 
-0.53653 0.06163 1 .O 0.87527 
MIPS 
Mean  
std. 
Minimum 
hlaximum 
-0.55480 -0.06042 0.87527 1 .O 
9738.94 19292696 1 1990 1 35.86 
1162.74 19175603 1490.27 60.2 1 
811 1.22 1677001 16 17847 0.50 . 
12013. 232933762 22968 203.00 
Forms pe r  Employee 
IRS: Tax Forms 
Number of Employees 
h l P S  
Table l c  Social Security Administration 
F o r m E m p  FOFLMS EhrPLOYEE hlKPS 
1 .O 0.11555 -0.24444 -0.05603 
0.11555 1 .O 0.93355 0.96367 
-0.24114 0.93355 1.0 0.95914 
-0.05603 0,96367 0.959 14 1 .O 
Mean  
St. Dev. 
Minimum 
hiaximum 
1874.24 153280459 821 10 89.50 
142.10 32003645 18536 74.3 1 
1656.03 1 1 1137000 61290 209.28 
220 1 .80 201714638 121806 6.68 
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Clients p e r  Employee 
SSA Beneficiaries 
Number of Employees 
MIPS 
hiean 
Std. Dev. 
hlinimum 
hlaximum 
ClientsIEmp CLIENTS EMPLOYEE MIPS 
1 .O 0.21101 -0.72326 0.82164 
0.21101 1 .O 0.19247 0.66059 
-0.72326 0.49247 1 .O -0.25838 
0.82461 0.66059 -0.25838 1 .O 
472.2 1 34388908 73990 125.66 
68.27 3930274 11688 199.54 
391.46 26228629 5 1202 8.4 1 
617.69 39832125 87754 660.77 
The model that we will use to analyze the data is deliberately simplistic product ivi~~ is 
treated as a linear function of the total number of employees, total measured workload. and 
installed computer capacity (mainframes and mini computers) measured in MIPS. The advantage + 
of this model is that it is easily understood: cetenrsparzbus, as workload increases, produciivit); 
increases; as employees increase, productivity decreases The variable of interest is bIIPS and 
the question we are trying to explore is whether or not productivity increases as the insta!led 
base of computing power increases The disadvantage is that the model is not likely to be usefkl 
outside the range of the data. Also, our model is not a production model and does not provide 
insight into elasticities, substitutions of labor for capital and scale efTects nor was it  intended for 
those purposes. 
Table 3 presents the results of a regression analysis of the equation 
Productivity=B1*MCPS+B2*Employee +B3 *Workload, 
where the variables are as previously described. PRODUCTIVITY is the measure of output per 
employee; MIPS is the installed base of computer capacity; EMPLOYEE is the size of the labor 
force for each year; WORKLOAD is the agency output measure 
Clearly the coefficients for both the labor force and the agency workload have the correct signs 
in all three equations. The important question of course is the impact that computer capacity 
(MIPS) has on productivity. 
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Table 3: Regression Analysis, by Agency 
Tab le  3 a  Federal Bureau of Investigation: 
Parameter Standard T for t i c  S tandudzed 
Variable DF Esumate Error P a r a n ~ e r e . ~  Prob > Ti Esumate 
bTERCEPT 1 9600.109111 258.57128513 37.129 0.0001 0.000000 
FIXGERDR 1 0.000051565 0.00000052 99.552 0.000 1 0.850369 
EMPLOYEE 1 -0.494712 0.01375513 -35.966 0.0001 -0.633067 
W S  1 0.995669 0.34040179 2.925 0.0091 0.051564 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
Source DF Squares Square F Value ProWF 
Model 3 27007776.403 9002592.1344 4852.872 0.0001 
Error 17 31536.80178 1855.10616 
C Tolal 20 270393 13.208 
Root MSE 43.07091 R-square 0.9988 Durbin-Wason D 0.883 
Dep Mean 9738.91281 Adj R-sq 0.9986 1st Order Autocorrelauon 0.270 
C.V. 0.43225 (N=2 1) 
T a b l e  3 b  Internal  Revenue Service 
Parameter Standxd T for Ho: Standardized 
Variable DF Estimate Error ParameteA Prob > p' Esrimate 
INTERCEPT 1 1732.942098 83.10285796 20.853 0.0001 0.0000000 
FORMS 1 0.000012 106 0.00000058 20.931 0.0001 2.7263927 
EMPLOYEE 1 -0.020677 0.00094250 -21.939 0.000 1 -2.6972159 
MiPS 1 -0.184058 0.31511874 -0.581 0.5668 0.0963742 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
Source DF Squares Square F Value Prob>F 
Model 3 395683 63382 131891.56127 273.987 0.0001 
E n o r  17 8183.62186 481.38952 
C Total 20 403867.30368 
Root MSE 2 1.91059 R - s q w e  0.9797 Durbin-Wawn D 0.81 1 
Dep Mean 1874.24013 Adj R-sq 0.9762 1st Order Autocorrelation 0.181 
C.V. 1.17061 N=2 1 
Tab le  3c  Social Security Administrat ion 
Parameter Standard T for IIO Standardized 
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameter4 Prob > (Tj Estimate 
M f R C E P T  1 517.394135 11.00017198 36.963 0.0001 moo00 
CLIENTS 1 0.0000 1 1051 0.00000081 13.215 0.0001 0.63632 
EMPLOYEE 1 -0.005835 0.0002 1859 -26.692 0.000 1 -0.99884 
MlPS 1 0.050030 0.01181321 3.37 1 0.0036 0.14622 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean 
Source DF Squares Square F Value Prob>F 
Model 3 92887.2382 1 30962.4 1271 1550.215 0.0001 
Error 17 339.54073 29.97298 
C Total 20 93226.77391 
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For the FBI. the coeficient on ;\.TIPS is positive and significant (1 00, P-value= 0094) 
For the IRS, MlPS 1s nesatlve and not significant (-0 18. P-value= 567) For Social Security, 
M I P S  is positive and significant ( 05, P-value= 0036) The implications of these findings are 
discussed below 
The results of the analysis are puzzling but not untypical of the prevlous research in 
some cases productivity rises with investments in IT, and in other cases productivity is not 
eEected. The g a p h s  in Figure 1 show that, for SSA, investment in IT capital rapidly expanded 
(increasing IT by a factor of 73 and IT capitaliemployee by a factor of 58 in the period 
1970-1 990) and that productivity closely followed these massive "Big Iron" investments. For the 
IRS, a very different pattern emerges: a 30 fold increase in IT capital and a 19 fold increase in IT 
capital/employee occurred in the period but productivity declined. At the FBI, a 200 fold 
increase in IT and a 350 fold increase in IT capitallemployee resulted in essentially no change in 
productivity. 
The results of the regression analysis are also interesting. As expected at SSA, the 
coefficient for MIPS/employee is positive and strong (p <.003). At 5 5 4  a 1% increase in 
productivity occurs for each 100 kfIPSlemployee increase. At IRS, the coefficient for 
MIPS/employee is weak and insignificant, that for LABOR is strong and very negative Adding 
MIPS at IRS, ceterus paribus, did nothing while adding employees brought large declines in 
productivity. Every 1,000 employees added by IRS in this period of rapid employment growth 
reduced productivity by 1%. The picture at the FBI is more sanguine The iMIPS/employee 
coefficient at the FBI is positive and significant ( 05, p < 009) but only about one-third the 
strength of the SSA coeficient (. 14). At the FBI, a little over 200 TvlIPS/employee increase Is 
needed to raise productivity 1%. However, while IT capital has modest positive effects at the 
FBI, it is insufficient to overcome the effects of hiring additional workers (which suppresses 
productivity). Overall then the FBI productivity drifts lower despite a 200 fold increase in IT 
capital even though the measure of productivity we use should be greatly impacted by IT 
spending. 
Discussion 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of  Business 
Working Paper IS-94-01 
One reviewer rased questions about the ~echnical adequacy of our model which we 
answer in the end notes ' We prefer here to focus on the substantive issues concerning the 
social construction of productivity. Obviously, each of the agencies made very different uses of 
IT capital in this time frame. The MIPS/employee coefficients are measures of how efiicient 
management was in converting IT capital into bottom line productivity (Weill, 1992). But the 
question is, why did these differences appear? We have three agencies each in the same 
administrative-political culture (the federal government), each with very information intense 
services and production hnctions, each heavily dependent on information technoloa, and each 
with long histories in developing information technology systems. There a.re of course 
technical differences evident in these data. For instance, SSA increased its IT capital 
endowmenb'employee by 58 fold, the FBI by 350 fold, and the IRS "only" by 19 fold. Is the 
answer that truly massive investments in IT are needed to bring about productivity benefits? 
We think not. Instead a carebl analysis of the macro cultures in which these agencies 
participated goes a long way in explaining how the productivity numbers above were socially 
constructed by the participants 
Cornparolive Mncro Ciiltures 
A brief review of the political administrative environment of the three agencies in this 
period sheds a good deal of light on how they used information technology differently and 
obtained different results. SSA entered the 1970s as an exemplar of leading edge mainframe 
technology use in the Federal gov-ernment. But during the 1970s several new programs were 
added to  their agenda (Supplemental Security Income, Black Lung, Medicaid) which brought 
millions of new clients and thousands of pages of new regulations to  learn and implement for 
SSA ehployees. At the same time, SSA failed to upgrade their systems as the number of clients 
rapidly increased with an aging population. Several efions at system modernization failed in the 
mid and late 1970s, and by 1980 systems nearly failed on several occasions to issue checks on 
time. Employment had ballooned by 30% in the 70s to cope with rising demands and failing 
systems. Senior executive turnover began to accelerate in the late 1970s, and internal conflicts 
with a unionized labor force expanded. Both Executive agencies ( O M ,  Ofiice of the 
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President, D E W )  and Congressional Committees became severely critical of SSA ( OT.4 
1986) 
As the leading accomplishment of the New Deal, SSA was an unpopular agency in the 
Reagan administration The President appointed several temporary Commissioners to head the 
agency, - who in turn developed a plan to modernize the agency's systems in the 1980s T h ~ s  
billion dollar Systems Modernization Plan was accepted by the White House on one condition 
SSA would have to  terminate 25,000 employees as evidence that the systems modernization 
would in fact lead to  higher levels of productivity. This deal was ultimately agreed to by key 
Con_gressional Committees who oversaw SSAs budget. SS-As senior manasement agreed in 
principle, but had a difficult time implementing the cutbacks BSrer firing one acting 
Commissioner, a new permanent Commissioner was appointed in 1986 (the first permanent 
Commissioner in the Reagan era) who agreed to implement the cutbacks. Several internal senior 
management shifts also occurred in 1986, including the creation of a new o e c e  of Deputy 
Commissioner of Systems--a CIO like position. (OTA, 1986). From a peak employment of 
87,000 in 1979, SSA has shrunk its labor force by 23,000 positions. 
In the end, SSA had little choice but to greatly reduce its labor force, develop new 
business procedures, new supporting software in order to survive the 1980s, and demonstrate 
that it could become more productive. Afier the expenditure of nearly 52 billion in the largest 
civilian system re-build to date, SSA enacted a new macro cultural en~lronment which had many 
. . 
participants (the President, OMB, and Congress). These external actors in SSA's organizational 
field, acting in concert with SSA senior management, created a p o w e h l  set of cultural 
expectations, backed up by the power of the budget. 
Very different conditions obtained at the IRS. As a money gathering agency in a period 
of s t aga t ion  (the 1970s) , and later in the 1980s high budget deficits, the IRS was a very 
popular agency in the Executive Branch and in Congress. There is nothing more important to 
the White House and the Congress (or to any government) than the collection of taxes. As a 
result, historically there has been little in-depth, critical oversight of the  agency (Burnham, 
1989). Through much of the 1970s the IRS experienced a relatively stable legal-regulatory tax 
environment, and its systems developed in the 1960s were sufficient. The Caner administration 
turned down a major effort to re-build IRS systems ( OTA, 1977). However, changes in tax law 
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in 1984, 1986 and 1987 began to wreak havoc on existing systems and personnel, and made for 
ereat confusion in the agency. By the mid-1980s LRS systems fell far behind in issuing tax 
" 
refunds. The IRS lobbied Congress for more people and more computing hardware using 
misleading data, alleging ever increasing non-compliance (even though later analyses found these 
reports ignored simple adjustments. see Long and Burnham, 1990) Several efforts to patch its 
systems in the 1980s failed, and in one instance led to a significant loss of tax receipts. Despite 
this chaos, there was little senior management turnover in the agency and neither the White 
House or Congress demanded that senior managers be held accountable Instead, both the 
President and Congress accepted IRS' claims that it simply needed more employees and more 
computers to  solve its problems There never were any demands for IRS to "modernize" its 
systems to the point where peopIe wouId be fired. Quite the opposite The President and 
Consress approved in this twenty year period a doubling of IRS employment, from 61,000 in 
1970 t o  121,000 in 1990. Currently, IRS is involved in its third attempt at modernization: a S6- 
8 billion Tax System Modernization program (GAO, 1990). 
The FBI shared a similar friendly political administrative macro environment. With a few 
exceptions in the 1960s and early 1970s, the OfKce of the President and key Congressional 
Committees have treated the FBI with great deference (Laudon, 1986). Even after the death in 
1974 of its powef i l  leader and protector, J:Edgar Hoover, the FBI remained a cornerstone of 
both the Carter and Reagan administration's anti-crime policy. Although few new programmatic 
responsibilities came its way, throughout the 1980s the FBI steadily enhanced its existing 
fingerprint record technology, mainframe installed base, and developed many new applications in 
expert systems, telecommunications, neural networks, and database search techniques 
Employment at the agency grew a modest 22% from 18,000 in 1970 to 22,000 in 1990. In the 
FBI's i a c r o  culture composed of key executive, legislative, and regulatory actors, there never 
were any calls for the FBI to "become more productive." There were indeed questions about 
the effectiveness of the FBI in general, and concern about the FBI's growing surveillance 
capabilities, but never any call for more productivity despite a 15 fold increase in its installed IT 
capital. 
Yet despite a non-demanding macro cultural environment, the F 3 I  nevertheless did 
achieve a modest amount of productivity impact from its systems investments (not enough t o  
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overcome the effects of hiring additional workers in t h s  period, but a positive impact 
nevertheless). Why? Here we would point to internal organizational factors: long term senior 
management commitment to systems development, a history of steady improvement--if not 
innovation-- in basic mainframe record systems, long term senior manasement stability in the 
systems area, a comparatively simple task--gathering, storing, disseminating fingerprint and 
other records which have changed little in twenty years, and tasks directly amenable to 
productivity enhancement through IT investments (Weill, 1992). These micro level structural 
and cultural factors were suEcient to produce modest productivity impacts from IT capita1 
spending. 
Conclusion 
W e  have argued that an important factor in understanding how IT enduced productivity 
is in fact produced is to look carefully at the macro culture in which an organization participates. 
When this macro culture demands productivity returns after or in anticipation of investments in 
IT, either the organization responds appropriately or it loses rank, influence, power and 
potentially its existence insofar as it is dependent on external organizations for resources and 
legitimacy. Typically the organization participates in the creation of these macro cultures, and 
they are collectively enacted. IT may make enable an appropriate response, and it may be a 
necessary condition for achieving higher levels of productivity in response to macro culture 
demands. But alone IT capital is not a sufficient condition for achieving higher levels of 
productivity as ours and other data show. 
This argument may well apply to the so-called turnaround in productivity numbers 
observed by Roach. To the embarrassment of many in the IS community, Roach reported in 
1987 that there was little evidence at the sector level of IT investments leading to higher 
productivity. But by January 1992 Roach was reporting that IT investments were indeed having 
a positive impact on productivity: service sector managers were aggressively "risht-sizing" their 
back oflice operations that for years were ridden with overcapacity and inefficiency 
"Restructuring appears to be the only answer [to achieve producitivity]. And, in our view, 
corporate restructuring strategies will be increasingly focused on "technology deliveranceH-- 
redirecting the tools of information technology toward measurable productivity paybacks 
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(Roach, 1992: 1). This turnaround in productivity statistics is not the result of management 
learnins how t o  use IT but instead a result of --we argue--of business macro culture panicipants 
like pension h n d s ,  large institutional investors, popular business journals, commentators like 
Roach, and others demanding much better returns on corporate investments as evidenced by 
productivity results and ultimate stock price performance This same macro culture now extols 
the virtues of re-engineering, re-designing business processes, and capturing the "business value" 
of information systems These slogans have become expectations of approved behavior, and 
they have come to  dominate the public announcements of corporate CEOs, business school 
Deans, and major consulting firms The strength of these macro cultural expectations is 
-enormous and more than sufficient to cause organizations to  ensure that productivity will indeed 
follow IT investments. 
An illustration of the power of this contemporary business macro culture was given in an 
interview of CIO of a large Mid Western insurance firm that had just undergone a $28 million, 
five-year re-engineering project which resulted in laying off 1,000 middle managers (about 20% 
of the labor force). In response to the question "What is re-engineering as you have come to 
practice it in your company?" he responded: 
"The first thing we did on this project was to fire half of the middle managers who 
worked here. Even though we were the best in the industry in terms of timely and quality 
service, we knew we could be better, we should be better. The second thing we did was to  put 
together a committee of some remaining middle managers and a few senior managers and send 
them around the company to figure out what the fired managers used to do N o  body really 
knew As it turns out, they didn't do much anyway! The third thing is we told this committee 
to come up with ways to get the same amount of work higher quality and less people Well 
soon we had a proposal on our desk and together we worked out the plan for new business 
procedures and new systems to support those procedures." 
Our point is that productivity is in pait a socially enacted macro-level affair measured by 
well known artifacts. Productivity does not simply result from strategic choice--as if those 
choices occur in a vacuum. Neither does productivity result automatically from appropriate 
behaviors randomly induced and selected out for survival by an invisible hand marketplace, or a 
competitive environment with limited resources. And neither does productivity simply result 
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Data Sources Notes 
General: Several federal sources were used in pans of the study to fill in gaps in data, and fill-in 
background knowledge on budgetary expenditures. See the following: 
Executive Office of the President. "Budget of the United States Government". United States 
Government Printing Office, (various years) 
"Annual Report Commissioner and Chief Counsel Internal Revenue Service" (various years) 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Srnristical Absnacr of the Unired States. 
(various years) 
Social Security Administration. Social Secr~riry Bt~IIefin: Aimrlnl Starisricnl Slipp/en.lent, 1991. 
Superindendent of Documents, U.S. Gov. Printing Office. 
Employees: 
There are several sources of total employment and none of the sources a r e e  with each other. The 
annual Executive Budgets of the U. S. Governent provide the best source since it has contained 
employment data since the 1940, is subject to more reviews than most other sources and it is 
widely available to the public. In addition, we would like to thank TRAC at Syracuse Univeristy, 
and Sue Long, for providing us with detailed employee head count data for the years 1970-1990 
Workload measures 
Social Security Administration publishes annaual statistics on the number of SS.4 clients. The 
Table 5.A4 (~163) of the 1991 Statistical Supplment of the SSA Bulletin contains number of 
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0.4SDI (Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance) beneficiaries and is the Vqorkioad data 
used for SSX. 
' Internal Revenue Service publishes an "Annual Repor?: Commissioner and Chief Counsel: 
Internal Revenue Service", which contains tax return data. A summary of this data is found in 
"Statistical Abstract of  the United States". These sources agree and both were used 
Federal Bureau of Investigation publishes an annual report that contained the fingerprint data 
(total number of  prints in the FBI's files) but discontinued this in the 1980s. From 1980 
on we relied on agency annual reports and interviews with FBI officials. In addition. we relied 
on annual reports of the Department of Justice: of which the FBI is a Bureau 
Computer Capaciiy (>TIPS) 
MlPS capacity data is derived from GSA annual reports of computer inventory in the federal 
government. (See also Eindor, 19851. We would like to thank the Babbbage Institute at the 
- 
University of ;Minnesota for supplying us with the detailed GSA annual sumeys of computer 
inventory in the federal government, 1970-1 990. 
' This has probably occurred in FIRE industries. While significant investments were made in 
ITto support operations, leading to important productivity advances in certain profit centers, 
poor loan practices in the 1980s greatly reduced insurance and bank earnings overall. Hence, 
while IT investment soared, overall FIRE productivity defined as revenues produced (output) 
per employee (inputs) stagnated during the 1980s. 
While IS professionals inside and outside of academia will no doubt rejoice at these optimistic 
findings of Brynjolfsson and Hitt, the authors themselves have pointed out in discussions at ICIS 
where the paper was given that there is no explanation in economics for why the return on IT 
capital is so much larger than non IT capital. 'Capitalists should invest in factors of production 
to the point where the marginal returns on investment across a11 factors are roughly equal. With 
returns on IT capital being 10 times the returns of non-IT capital, managers have apparently 
been acting irrationally and have severely under invested in IT. 
Greenstein (1993) found that for the period 1968-1983 best hardware mainframe practice 
lagged "mean" mainframe practive by only 6-7 years, roughly half the lag of  other non-IT 
technoloiies. This does not totally vitiate the claims of Brynjolfsson and Hitt who could still 
argue that there are lags in human learning. and organizational f o n ,  which could account for 
the observed delay in productivity benefits from IT investments. On  the other hand, this 
assumes that at some point managers "catch up" and learn how to  d o  it. But this is uncrealisric 
. looking at the history of hardware and sofiware innovation in the 80s and 90s Change is 
continual, constant, large scale, and framebreaking through much of  this period. blanagers may 
never really catch up. By the time they have learned, a new t echno log  comes along to make 
the old learning less valuable. 
4 Along these lines the Brynjolfsson and B t t  (1993) data is remarkable They claim that their 
Cobb-Douglas production hnction accounts for 99% of the variance in output in their sample of  
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380 firms Generally, these high levels o f W  are attainabie only in samples of restricted 
variance Their finding suggests that there really is no need to take into account management o r  
or~anizational - differences among organizations when examining productivity. Yet this finding is 
contrary to  many others which find mangement and organiztional factors very imponant, even 
contrary to their own conclusions that variations in historical period, and management learning 
are imponant factors in understanding productivity of IT investments. This is not to deny t h a ~  
on balance this study is the best in terms of data and modelling, just that the findings are 
remarkable. 
In part this may be because the IRS output variable (forms processed) already accounts for 
increasing complexity in tax law and regulations One measure of increasing complexity of work 
for the IRS is the number of forms it has to process New laws and regulations spawn new 
forms. At the FBI, arguably, the complexity of w( rk (output variable of fingerprint processing) 
has changed little in twenty years At SSA entitle nent programs have grown significantly. as 
have the complexity of individual cases, although t'lis has had little effect on OASDI (the old age 
retirement program) which is the largest program administered by SSA. 
6 All the models were estimated using the SAS REG procedure (SAS ver 6.08). Cleariy all of the 
models have good F-statistics and R Squares. The analysis includes both the unit betas (listed 
under "Parameter Estimate") and the standardized betas (listed on the far right under 
"Standardized Estimate"). 
7 First there are some issues about the adequacy of the model that we  would like to  discuss 
Although workload and employees appear on bcth sides of the equation, the enter the 
productivity (LHS) in a non-linear way. The s im~le  correlation statistics for these two variabies 
are reported in Table 1 and it can be clearly seen rhat these variables do not have a uniform impact 
over all three agencies. 
Second,. the data was examined for collinearity ~ 2 d  other problems. Collinearity was not a major 
problem. The condition index run from 49 to 72, which indicates that there is some coliinearity 
However, it is well below 100, the level at which excessively inflated variances occur (Belsley, 
Kuh and Welsch, 1980). ' However, the variance inflation factors were examined but were 
severe only for IRS. (IRS has sufficiently large coliinearity problems that no variables were 
entered when using the stepwise selection option.) 
Third, from the Durbin-Watson test, it is clear thzt serial correlation is present in at least the IRS 
and FBI models. [ For three parameters and N=2 1 the 5% level of significance the lower limit of 
D (accept the hypothesis of serial correlation) is 1.03 and the upper limit of D (reject the 
hypothesis of serial correlation) is 1.67 At the0l% level of significance, D(1)=.80 and D(u)=l.41. 
Thus, serial correlation is probably present for the FBI and IRS and indeterminate for SSA.] 
The primary problem with positive serial correlation is that reduces the estimated standard error 
which in turn causes the reported t-values of the parameters to be too large. Since the agency with 
the most sever case of serial correlation (IRS) is also the agency in which MIPS are already 
statistically insignificant a refinemeni was not felt warranted 
Finally, it is possible to  "cure" most of the defects of these regression estimates by a variety of 
legitimate statistical techniques ranging fiom introducing dummy variables at places where the 
data series had major changes (e.g. the FBI in 1977, IRS in 198 I) ,  adding AR(1) corrections, and 
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selecting only variables that would improve the fit (R-sq ) . iU1 of these techniques Lvere applied. 
however, none of these teckruques changed the overall results about the varying efiPcts of 
. 
computers on productivity in these three agencies: increases in installed computer capacity, as 
measured in n/IIPS, increased productivity in the SSA,  was related to a smaller increase in the 
FBI, and had essentially no effect on productivity at IRS. 
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